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OBSCURED BOUNDARIES: DIMAYA’S
EXPANSION OF THE VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS
DOCTRINE
Katherine Brosamle*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States, despite being dubbed the “nation of
immigrants,”1 is no stranger to excluding those deemed “undesirable”
by the governing majority.2 This often-discriminatory intent to
exclude manifests in immigration law, which has continually
expanded and transformed throughout history. One pertinent
development is the emergence of “crimmigration law”—a term
generally referring to “the intersection of criminal law and procedure
with immigration law and procedure.”3
Three broad trends have contributed to this recent crimmigration
phenomenon:
[1] criminal convictions now lead to immigration law
consequences ever more often; [2] violations of immigration
* J.D. Candidate, May 2019, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., History, University of
California, Los Angeles. I wish to thank Ifrah Hassan for her valuable feedback and encouragement
throughout the writing process. Special thanks as well to Molly Christ and Labdhi Sheth, to the
members of Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligent work, and to my family for their
enduring support.
1. This moniker was popularized after the posthumous publication of President John F.
Kennedy’s book, A Nation of Immigrants, but has been traced as far back as 1874 when an editorial
appearing in the The Daily State Journal of Alexandria noted, “We are a nation of immigrants and
immigrants’ children.” See Miriam Jordan, Is America a ‘Nation of Immigrants’? Immigration
Agency Says No, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/us/uscisnation-of-immigrants.html (discussing the removal of this phrase from the mission statement of
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services).
2. CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, CRIMMIGRATION LAW 4–8 (2015)
(providing an overview of American immigration policy); see generally Paul Brickner & Meghan
Hanson, The American Dreamers: Racial Prejudices and Discrimination as Seen Through the
History of American Immigration Law, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 203, 203 (2004) (“The history of
American immigration law can be divided into stages that reflect racial prejudices and
discriminations of the day.”).
3. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 3; see also Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration
Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006) (coining the phrase
“crimmigration” and discussing its origins).
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law are increasingly punished through the criminal justice
system; and [3] law enforcement tactics traditionally viewed
as parts of one or the other area of law have crossed into the
other making enforcement of immigration law resemble
criminal law enforcement and turning criminal law
enforcement into a semblance of immigration law
enforcement.4
The first trend reflects a shift in the composition of people prioritized
as “undesirable.” Throughout early American history, deportability
“turned on race or national origin.”5 Focus transferred in the early
twentieth century to the exclusion of specific ideologies such as
anarchism, socialism, and communism.6 Finally, in the 1980s, “the
preferred measure of undesirability [became] crime.”7 Today,
immigration law, political rhetoric, and policy decisions reflect a
mounting concern about so-called “criminal immigrants.”8
Sessions v. Dimaya9 illustrates this increasingly complex web of
crimmigration law. In this case, a lawfully-present immigrant acted
unlawfully, and, in addition to the criminal punishment of
incarceration, he faced the steepest immigration repercussion—
deportation without any possibility of relief.10 And yet, he ultimately
4. GARCÍA HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 2, at 3.
5. Id. at 23.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703, 1723–36 (2018) (outlining the origins of crimmigration and detailing recent legislative action
that has further merged criminal and immigration law together in Part I:B–C); David Alan
Sklansky, Crime, Immigration, and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 157, 196
(2012) (“In defending Arizona’s recent efforts to crack down on illegal immigration . . . the state’s
governor did not talk about immigrants using public benefits, the leitmotif of antiimmigration rhetoric a decade or so ago; she talked about crime. Part of what has blurred the line
between immigration enforcement and crime control may in fact be a kind of cultural obsession
with violence and victimization, a tendency to see everything through the lens of crime control.”);
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf’t, to Immigration and
Customs
Enf’t
Employees
(Mar. 2, 2011),
https://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (announcing increased
enforcement priority to “criminal immigrants” under the Obama Administration); Katie Rogers,
Trump Highlights Immigrant Crime to Defend His Border Policy. Statistics Don’t Back Him Up.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June 22, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/22/us/politics/trumpimmigration-borders-family-separation.html; see generally César Cuauhtémoc García
Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1346 (2014) (detailing the
historic relationship between criminal and immigration law and contending that immigrant
detention is punitive).
9. 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
10. Id. at 1210–11.
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found relief, albeit through an unusual mechanism—the void-forvagueness doctrine.11
Aliens can be subjected to removal from the United States if they
commit “aggravated felonies,”12 a term with many definitions,
including the commission of a “crime of violence.”13 The term “crime
of violence” in turn has two separate definitions.14 In Dimaya, the
petitioner was charged as removable due to his prior convictions,
which were deemed aggravated felonies under the definition of “crime
of violence” set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b).15 On review, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit remanded the petitioner’s immigration
proceedings after determining that section 16(b) was
unconstitutionally vague and thus, void.16 A divided Supreme Court
ultimately upheld the Ninth Circuit’s holding, a decision that
eliminated one ground for deportation of “criminal immigrants” and
created broader uncertainty as to the scope of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine.17
Although a majority of the Justices agreed that section 16(b) was
unconstitutionally vague, there was no settled majority as to the
underlying basis for extending the void-for-vagueness doctrine into
the realm of immigration law.18 This doctrine “guarantees that
ordinary people have ‘fair notice’ of the conduct a statute
proscribes.”19 It serves as a shield against “arbitrary or discriminatory
law enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards to govern
the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and judges.”20
However, the doctrine has traditionally been limited to criminal
statutes with limited exceptions.21 By extending its application to
immigration law, its scope has been called into question.
11. Id. at 1211–12.
12. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
13. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
14. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (2012) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means—(a) an offense that has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial
risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”).
15. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1211.
16. Id. at 1212.
17. Id. at 1223.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1212 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972)).
20. Id. (citing Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983)).
21. Id.
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This Comment argues that the Supreme Court properly extended
the void-for-vagueness doctrine to find section 16(b)
unconstitutionally vague. Part II sets forth the relevant statutory
framework, and Part III outlines the factual and procedural history of
the Dimaya case. Part IV breaks down the reasoning of the opinion
delivered by Justice Kagan, distinguishes the concurrence penned by
Justice Gorsuch, and highlights the dissenting arguments of Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas. Part V analyzes the Justices’
various interpretations of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and
advocates for the broad construction outlined in the concurrence. Part
VI examines the practical impacts of Dimaya on immigration
enforcement and future immigration reform. Finally, Part VII
concludes that Dimaya’s legacy lies in its furtherance of the void-forvagueness doctrine.
II. RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
On June 27, 1952, American immigration law and policy were
completely revamped with the passage of the comprehensive
McCarran-Walter Act, more commonly known as the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA).22 The Senate Judiciary Committee drafted
the INA after a two-year study on immigration conducted in response
to mounting fears of communism.23 Congress passed the INA, despite
President Harry S. Truman’s veto and concerns about the “severe
hardships involving exclusion, deportation, and denaturalization.”24
Although amended over the past several decades,25 the INA endures
as the main source of immigration law.26
Truman’s disregarded apprehensions about the severe difficulties
involved with deportation and the structure of the INA remain
germane. Indeed, the issue raised in Dimaya centers on a specific
ground for the deportation of “criminal immigrants.”

22. RICHARD D. STEEL, STEEL ON IMMIGRATION LAW § 1:2, Westlaw (database updated
Nov. 2018).
23. Id.
24. Id.; see also MARGARET C. JASPER, LEGAL ALMANAC: THE LAW OF IMMIGRATION § 1:7,
Westlaw (database updated 2012) (noting President Truman’s veto of the INA).
25. The INA, including all subsequent amendments and additional provisions, is contained in
Title 8 of the United States Code which deals with “Aliens and Nationality.”
26. 1 SHANE DIZON & POOJA DADHANIA, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE 2D § 1:120, Westlaw
(database updated Feb. 2019).
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Again, with the rising crimmigration trend, criminal convictions
are increasingly coupled with immigration consequences. Under the
INA, “[a]ny alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time
after admission is deportable”27 and ineligible for cancellation of
removal.28 Thus, “removal is a virtual certainty for [] alien[s] found to
have an aggravated felony conviction,” regardless of the length of
their residency in or connections to the United States. 29
The term “aggravated felony” is defined in section 1101,
subdivision 43 of the INA through a wide-ranging list of specific
offenses and cross-references to various federal criminal statutes.30
Among this list of qualifying offenses is “a crime of violence (as
defined in section 16 of Title 18 . . . ) for which the term of
imprisonment [is] at least one year.”31 The aforementioned criminal
statute (hereinafter referred to as “section 16”) sets forth two distinct
definitions for the term “crime of violence.”32 First, subdivision a,
known as the elements clause, covers any “offense that has as an
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person or property of another.”33 Second, subdivision b,
known as the residual clause, covers any “offense that is a felony and
that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in the course of
committing the offense.”34
When analyzing a crime under the residual clause, courts use a
“categorical approach,” which looks to the general “nature of the
offense,” as opposed to whether “‘the particular facts’ underlying a
conviction” or “the statutory elements of a crime” present the
substantial risk demanded.35 Thus, courts seeking to apply the residual
clause of section 16 look to an “idealized ordinary case” of any given
offense.36

27. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).
28. Id. § 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C); see also 3 SHANE DIZON & POOJA DADHANIA, IMMIGRATION
LAW SERVICE § 13:222, 2D Westlaw (updated Aug. 2019) (detailing the impact of aggravated
felony convictions on eligibility for relief).
29. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018).
30. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2012).
31. Id. § 1101(a)(43)(F).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 16.
33. Id. § 16(a).
34. Id. § 16(b).
35. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1211 (2018).
36. Id. at 1214 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015)).
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In sum, section 16 delineates two classifications of “crimes of
violence”—elemental and residual—both of which qualify as
aggravated felonies, the commission of which is grounds for
deportation. The underlying proceedings in Dimaya illustrate how
immigration courts have interpreted and utilized section 16’s residual
clause in removal proceedings.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Original Immigration Proceedings
Petitioner James Garcia Dimaya, a native citizen of the
Philippines, was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent
resident in 1992.37 In 2007, and again in 2009, Dimaya was convicted
of first-degree residential robbery under California law.38 Each
conviction carried a two-year sentence.39
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) characterized these
convictions as aggravated felonies and subsequently charged Dimaya
as removable without eligibility for relief.40 The Immigration Judge
(IJ) assigned to Dimaya’s case agreed with DHS and found that the
robbery convictions qualified as aggravated felonies under the
definition set forth in the residual clause of section 16. 41 The
categorical approach employed by section 16(b) required that the IJ
look to an idealized version of a burglary, not the actual circumstances
of Dimaya’s two robberies. Specifically, the IJ cited United States v.
Becker42 for the proposition that a burglary is a crime of violence and
explained that “unlawful entry into a residence is by its very nature an
offense where is apt to be violence [sic], whether in the efforts of the
felon to escape or in the efforts of the occupant to resist the felon.”43
The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) subsequently dismissed
Dimaya’s appeal on the same ground and affirmed the IJ’s decision.44

37. Dimaya v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2015) aff’d sub nom Sessions v. Dimaya,
138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).
38. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1111. Specifically, Dimaya was charged under California Penal
Code, section 459. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112.
42. 919 F.2d 568, 573 (9th Cir. 1990).
43. Dimaya, 803 F.3d at 1112.
44. Id.
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B. Ninth Circuit Review
Dimaya filed a petition for review of the BIA’s decision with the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.45 During the interim period
between initial arguments and the court’s judgment, the Supreme
Court decided Johnson v. United States,46 which found the term
“violent felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) 47 to be
unconstitutionally vague.48 In response to Johnson, the Ninth Circuit
ordered supplemental briefs and arguments due to the similar structure
and wording of section 16 and the overturned ACCA provision.49
Ultimately, seeing no meaningful distinctions between the two
provisions, the Ninth Circuit directly applied Johnson, and held that
section 16(b) was unconstitutionally vague, and remanded Dimaya’s
case to the BIA for further proceedings.50
In the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s extension of Johnson, three
other circuit courts took up the same issue with varying results, 51 and
the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve this split in circuit
authority.52
IV. REASONING OF THE COURT
In determining how the Johnson holding applied to the issue
presented in Dimaya, two distinct inquiries were presented—first,
whether the void-for-vagueness analysis used to reach the Johnson
decision could apply in this civil context, and second, whether the
statutes at issue in Dimaya and Johnson were sufficiently analogous
to warrant a similar finding of unconstitutionality. The Justices vastly

45. Id.
46. 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018) (“[T]he term ‘violent felony’ means any crime punishable
by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the
use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment
for such term if committed by an adult, that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.”).
48. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
49. Dimaya, 803 F.3d 1112.
50. Id. at 1120.
51. Compare Shuti v. Lynch, 15-3835 (6th Cir. July 7, 2016) (finding section 16(b)
unconstitutionally vague), and United States v. Vivas-Ceja, 808 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 2015) (same),
with United States v. Gonzalez-Longoria, 831 F.3d 670 (5th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (upholding
section 16(b)).
52. Lynch v. Dimaya, 137 S. Ct. 31 (2016).
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diverged in their views on both questions. Ultimately, the judgment
came down to a 5–4 vote in favor of overturning section 16(b), and
resulted in an opinion by Justice Kagan, a concurrence in part and in
the judgment by Justice Gorsuch, and two separate dissents from both
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.53
A. The Court’s Opinion
The Court’s opinion sets forth the majority’s judgment and a
plurality analysis of the scope of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
To ultimately find section 16(b) unconstitutionally vague under
the Johnson framework, the opinion begins with a justification for the
application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to a civil immigration
statute.54 Writing for the plurality, Justice Kagan cited an immigration
case pre-dating the INA itself—Jordan v. De George55—where the
Supreme Court found an immigration law making aliens deportable
for convictions of “crimes of moral turpitude” to be “sufficiently
definite.”56 Although not a criminal statute, the Supreme Court in
Jordan tested and upheld this immigration provision under the voidfor-vagueness doctrine because of the “grave nature of deportation,”
which is a “‘drastic measure,’ often amounting to lifelong ‘banishment
or exile.’”57 Drawing on this notion, the Dimaya plurality in essence
cited the crimmigration phenomenon, without explicitly using the
term, as the basis for application of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to
immigration law today. In light of and considering the “particularly
severe penalty” of deportation and increasing connection between
deportability and criminal convictions, the plurality determined that
the most exacting vagueness standard should apply even though
removal is a civil matter.58
Having established the relevance of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine, the majority looked to Johnson, which it described as a
“straightforward decision, with equally straightforward application
here.”59 The residual clause of the ACCA provision at issue in Johnson
defined the term “violent felony” as one involving a “serious potential
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2018).
Id. at 1212–13. Justice Gorsuch did not join this analysis in Part II.
341 U.S. 223, 229 (1951).
Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213 (quoting Jordan, 341 U.S. at 231.).
Id. (quoting Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948)).
Id.
Id.
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risk of physical injury,”60 whereas section 16’s residual clause defines
a “crime of violence” as one involving a “substantial risk that physical
force” will be used.61 In Johnson, the Supreme Court identified two
features of ACCA’s residual clause that jointly “produced hopeless
indeterminacy,” and rendered the clause unconstitutionally vague.62
First, the use of a categorical approach, centered around a crime’s
“ordinary case,” was imprecise and speculative. 63 Second, the
ACCA’s residual clause failed to identify the required “threshold level
of risk.”64 Although the second element did not independently render
the provision unduly vague, when compounded with the first issue, it
did.65
Turning then to the residual clause of section 16, the Dimaya
majority found the same two dangerous elements—the use of a
categorical approach and an indeterminate level of required risk.66
Thus, section 16(b), just like the ACCA’s residual clause, created
“more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause
tolerates.”67
To conclude, the opinion addressed the dissenters—first Justice
Thomas68 and then Chief Justice Roberts. Thomas questioned the
validity of the void-for-vagueness doctrine at length before ultimately
taking the position that if vagueness were to be considered, analysis
under the residual clause of section 16 should switch from categorical
to case-specific to avoid invalidating the law.69 The plurality noted this
was the same argument raised in Johnson’s dissent.70 There, like here,
60. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2018).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012).
62. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1213 (quoting Johnson v. United State, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558
(2015)).
63. Id. at 1214 (“[A] court was supposed to ‘imagine’ an ‘idealized ordinary case of the
crime’—or otherwise put, the court had to identify the ‘kind of conduct the “ordinary case” of a
crime involves.’ But how, Johnson asked, should a court figure that out? By using a statistical
analysis of the state reporter? A survey? Expert evidence? Google? Gut instinct? ACCA provided
no guidance, rendering judicial accounts of the ‘ordinary case’ wholly ‘speculative.’”).
64. Id.
65. Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015)) (“‘By combining
indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much
risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause’ violates the guarantee
of due process.”).
66. Id. at 1215–16.
67. Id. at 1216 (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558).
68. Gorsuch did not join in this section, Part IV-A, which rebutted Thomas’s dissent.
69. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1216.
70. Id.
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the Government did not request such a switch, which would create
new and separate constitutional inquiries.71
Conversely, Roberts’s dissent adopted the Government’s position
that section 16 was sufficiently distinguishable from its ACCA
counterpart.72 First, the Government noted that unlike the ACCA
provision, section 16(b)’s temporal restriction73 arguably made the
inquiry “more focused.”74 The majority noted that although the ACCA
had no such temporal restriction on its face, in practice, the Supreme
Court had never looked at conduct beyond that committed in the
course of the offense when applying the ACCA’s residual clause.75
Thus, the express inclusion of this restriction in section 16 did not
change the inquiry or make it more focused. 76 Second, the
Government focused on section 16’s use of the term “physical force”
versus the ACCA’s use of the term “physical injury.”77 The majority
found this distinction meaningless.78 Third, the Government noted that
a “confusing list of exemplar crimes” proceeded the ACCA provision
that contributed to the statute’s vagueness.79 Since section 16 lacked
any such list, the Government argued section 16 was more readily
understandable.80 The majority again found this argument to be
illogical.81 Finally, the Government cited judicial experience, in that
courts have divided less frequently on the residual clause of section 16
than they did on the ACCA residual clause, as a sign that section 16
was clearer than the ACCA.82 The majority vehemently rejected this
notion.83
71. Id. at 1217 (noting that the categorial approach originated out of Sixth Amendment
concerns that sentencing courts would become fact-finders).
72. Id. at 1218.
73. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (stating that the risk must arise from acts taken “in the course of
committing the offense”).
74. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1219–20.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1220.
78. Id. at 1220–21 (noting that “evaluating the risk of ‘physical force’ itself entails considering
the risk of ‘physical injury’”).
79. Id. at 1221.
80. Id.
81. Id. (“To say that ACCA’s listed crimes failed to resolve the residual clause’s vagueness is
hardly to say they caused the problem. . . . Johnson found the residual clause’s vagueness to reside
in just ‘two’ of its features: the ordinary-case requirement and a fuzzy risk standard. Strip away the
enumerated crimes—as Congress did in § 16(b)—and those dual flaws yet remain.”).
82. Id. at 1221–22.
83. Id. at 1223 (“[T]his Court’s experience in deciding ACCA cases only supports the
conclusion that § 16(b) is too vague . . . . The Government would condemn us to repeat the past—
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Having set forth her argument and refuted the dissenters, Kagan
concluded that under Johnson, the residual clause of section 16 was
unconstitutionally vague and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision.84
B. Justice Gorsuch’s Concurrence
While Justice Gorsuch joined in the judgment and many parts of
the Court’s opinion, he diverged on the issue of the scope and
applicability of the void-for-vagueness doctrine to non-criminal
matters. Whereas the plurality focused on the gravity of a statute’s
consequences as justification for extending the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to immigration law, Gorsuch went further and opined that the
doctrine should apply more broadly to all criminal and civil laws.85
Gorsuch first sought to ensure that the void-for-vagueness
doctrine enjoyed “a secure footing in the original understanding of the
Constitution.”86 To do so, Gorsuch detailed an extensive history of the
“due process underpinnings” of the doctrine.87 Collectively,
Gorsuch’s compendium of varied sources spoke to a history, in both
English common law and American jurisprudence, of concerns over
the lack of fair notice in laws that pose the risk of the deprivation of
life, liberty, or property as penalty—a fear not limited just to criminal
laws.88
Gorsuch turned to the inquiry of an applicable standard of
review—“What degree of imprecision should this Court tolerate in a
statute before declaring it unconstitutionally vague?”89 The
Government argued that civil laws should only be deemed
unconstitutional if they are “unintelligible,” whereas criminal laws

to rerun the old ACCA tape, as though we remembered nothing from its first showing. But why
should we disregard a lesson so hard learned? ‘Insanity,’ Justice Scalia wrote in the last ACCA
residual clause case before Johnson, ‘is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting
different results.’ We abandoned that lunatic practice in Johnson and see no reason to start it
again.”).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1224, 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 1228.
87. Id. at 1224–28 (citing an expansive range of sources, including everything from recent
Supreme Court precedent to 14th century caselaw, the scholarship of Lord Coke and Blackstone
among contemporary law review articles, to the Declaration of Independence and Federalist
Papers).
88. Id. (“[T]he Constitution sought to preserve a common law tradition that usually aimed to
ensure fair notice before any deprivation of life, liberty, or property could take place, whether under
the banner of the criminal or the civil law.”).
89. Id. at 1228.
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have historically been required to provide “ordinary people . . . fair
notice of the conduct” made punishable.90 In light of the history he set
forth, Gorsuch could not see why different standards were needed. 91
Moreover, the Supreme Court had previously extended the strictest
vagueness test to civil laws—namely, “those abridging basic First
Amendment freedoms.”92 Turning to the argument promulgated by the
plurality portion of the Court’s opinion, that the applicability of the
void-for-vagueness doctrine hinges on the severity of a law’s
consequences, Gorsuch highlighted the severity of many civil
penalties:
Today’s “civil” penalties include confiscatory rather than
compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow homes
to be taken, remedies that strip persons of their professional
licenses and livelihoods, and the power to commit persons
against their will indefinitely. Some of these penalties are
routinely imposed and are routinely graver than those
associated with misdemeanor crimes—and often harsher
than the punishment for felonies. And not only are “punitive
civil sanctions . . . rapidly expanding,” they are “sometimes
more severely punitive than the parallel criminal
sanctions for the same conduct.”93
Therefore, under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, a “fair notice
standard” should apply to all laws.
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent focused on distinguishing the
residual clauses of section 16 from the ACCA, such that section 16(b)
should have been upheld.94 Roberts did not entertain the debate over
the scope of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, because he did not find

90. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556
(2015)).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1228–29 (citing Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 499 (1982)).
93. Id. at 1229 (alteration in original) (quoting Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The
Middle Ground Between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE. L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992)).
94. Id. at 1234 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see The Court’s Opinion, supra Section IV(A)
(discussing the arguments of the Government and Roberts regarding the differences between the
residual clauses).
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section 16(b) to be unconstitutionally vague, even under the
heightened criminal standard.95
D. Thomas’s Dissent
Justice Thomas joined in Roberts’s dissenting analysis of the
residual clauses, but wrote separately to discuss the void-forvagueness doctrine.96 Thomas’s dissent is most at odds with Gorsuch’s
concurrence—whereas Gorsuch advocated for a broader interpretation
of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, Thomas questioned the doctrine
all together.97
Thomas surmised that the majority’s holding depends on the
validity of three premises: “[1] [t]he Due Process Clause requires
federal statutes to provide certain minimal procedures, [2] the
vagueness doctrine is one of those procedures, and [3] the vagueness
doctrine applies to statutes governing the removal of aliens.”98
Thomas then questioned each proposition in turn.
First, Thomas noted that the void-for-vagueness doctrine could
only operate if the “law of the land” view of due process 99 was
invalid.100 Despite the Supreme Court’s rejection101 of this view over
a century and a half ago, Thomas argued that it had “textual and
historical support.”102 Thomas contended that vagueness analysis did
not begin until the twentieth century, but rather courts historically had
followed a “traditional rule of lenity”103—a “tool of statutory
construction.”104 The void-for-vagueness doctrine, Thomas argued,
was not historical; rather, it was part of the Supreme Court’s “bad habit

95. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1234 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1242 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. This view “require[s] only that our Government . . . proceed . . . according to written
constitutional and statutory provision[s] before depriving someone of life, liberty, or property.” Id.
at 1242–43 (alterations in original) (quoting Nelson v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 1249, 1264 n.1 (2017)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
100. Id.
101. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276–77
(1855).
102. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1243.
103. The “traditional rule of lenity” refers to the “common law doctrine, also known as ‘strict
construction,’ that directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities in favor of criminal defendants.”
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 885 (2004).
104. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1244.
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of invoking the Due Process Clause to constitutionalize rules that were
traditionally left to the democratic process.”105
Second, Thomas contended that, even assuming that the Due
Process Clause banned vague laws, the void-for-vagueness argument
would not apply to civil, immigration laws.106 Noting the “founding
generation’s” decision that due process was inapplicable to removal
statutes,107 Thomas noted that due process was not implicated until the
twentieth century with regards to removal statutes.108 And even still,
the Supreme Court “upheld vague standards in immigration laws that
it likely would not have tolerated in criminal statutes.”109 Therefore, it
is “at best, unclear” whether federal immigration law can violate the
Due Process Clause due to vagueness. 110
Thomas found it unnecessary to resolve this uncertainty, as the
issue raised in this case was solvable on narrower grounds—namely,
how, not if, vagueness challenges could be raised.111 “If the vagueness
doctrine has any basis in the original meaning of the Due Process
Clause, it must be limited to case-by-case challenges to particular
applications of a statute.”112 Thus, Thomas believed that Dimaya
needed to show how section 16 was vague as to him specifically.113
Without this showing, Thomas found no issue with any purported
vagueness of section 16.
Thomas concluded by arguing that the residual clause of section
16 should be switched from a categorical analysis to a case-specific
one.114
V. THE SCOPE OF CONSTITUTIONAL VAGUENESS
The most derisive inquiry raised in Dimaya was not the specific
issue with section 16(b), but rather the fundamental question regarding
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1245.
107. Id. at 1245–46 (discussing a 1798 debate over the Alien Acts, in which the Federalists
successfully argued that due process was inapplicable to statutes governing the removal of aliens).
108. Id. at 1247.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1247–48.
111. Id. at 1250.
112. Id.
113. Id. (“In my view, § 16(b) is not vague as applied to respondent. When respondent
committed his burglaries in 2007 and 2009, he was ‘sufficiently forewarned . . . that the statutory
consequence . . . is deportation.’ At the time, courts had ‘unanimous[ly]’ concluded that residential
burglary is a crime of violence, and not ‘a single opinion . . . ha[d] held that [it] is not.’”).
114. Id. at 1252–59; see id. at 1216–18 (majority opinion) (discussing this argument).
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the scope and applicability of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Arguments were raised in favor of a vast spectrum of interpretations.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine is typically contemplated within
the criminal context.115 Justice Kagan, writing for the plurality, called
for its broader application to all statutes which result in severe
consequences or penalties.116 Justices Thomas and Gorsuch
championed opposing extremes—Thomas dissented by calling the
doctrine into question altogether,117 while Gorsuch, in his
concurrence, advocated for its equal application to all laws,
irrespective of the severity of consequences.118 In the absence of a
majority holding on this issue, the scope of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is presently unclear. It is this Comment’s position that
Gorsuch’s broad interpretation is the most appropriate, in light of the
history of and principles supporting the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
A. Historical Origins
While Gorsuch recalls a history with origins reaching back far
beyond even the framing of the Constitution, Thomas dismisses the
void-for-vagueness doctrine as a recent judicial creation. In reality, the
history is unclear, but falls somewhere in between.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine, as it is known today, was likely
not used prior to the nineteenth century.119 At common law, the rule
of lenity governed.120 Without a doctrine of judicial supremacy,
English courts could not “explicitly . . . invalidate the product of the
legislative branch,” so they “resorted to canons of construction to give
‘content’ to vague statutes.”121 This practice carried into colonial
America and thus neither the Federalists Papers nor the Constitutional
Convention expressly contemplated vagueness as grounds for
invalidating laws.122 Although the void-for-vagueness doctrine does
not have explicit common law origins, the principles underlying the
115. Id. at 1212–13.
116. Id. at 1213.
117. Id. at 1242 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 1224, 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
119. Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. L.J. 272, 274
(1948); see also Christina D. Lockwood, Defining Indefiniteness: Suggested Revisions to the Void
for Vagueness Doctrine, 8 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 255, 263 (2010) (noting that the
void-for-vagueness doctrine was not used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries).
120. See Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra note 119.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 274–75; see also Lockwood, supra note 119, at 263 (noting the same).
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doctrine—the need for fair notice and fear of arbitrary enforcement—
were contemplated and implicated throughout this period and in early
American law.123
As Gorsuch notes, many Constitutional provisions “presuppose
and depend on the existence of reasonably clear laws.”124 This reflects
a concern expressed in the Declaration of Independence and
deliberated throughout the drafting of the Constitution—that arbitrary
power could divest citizens of life, liberty, or property without
sufficient notice. “Fair notice of the law’s demands . . . is ‘the first
essential of due process.’”125 Due process, as it was contemplated at
the inception of the Constitution, is embodied in the Fifth Amendment
which clearly protects the inalienable rights announced in the
Declaration of Independence: “No person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”126 One such
protection against an unjust deprivation of rights is the requirement
that laws be definite and comprehensible, such that (1) the people
know what conduct could result in a deprivation of their liberty; and
(2) laws are not arbitrarily enforced.127
Further, the structure of the Constitution allowed for the transition
from the practice of statutory lenity to use of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. While Congress is assigned, “All legislative Powers,”128 the
123. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1228 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co.,
269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
124. Id. at 1226–27 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 308 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)) (“Take the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that arrest warrants must be supported by
probable cause, and consider what would be left of that requirement if the alleged crime had no
meaningful boundaries. Or take the Sixth Amendment’s mandate that a defendant must be informed
of the accusations against him and allowed to bring witnesses in his defense, and consider what use
those rights would be if the charged crime was so vague the defendant couldn ’t tell what he’s
alleged to have done and what sort of witnesses he might need to rebut that charge. Without an
assurance that the laws supply fair notice, so much else of the Constitution risks becoming only a
‘parchment barrie[r]’ against arbitrary power.”).
125. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1226–28 (quoting Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391
(1926)).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
127. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62 (James Madison) (“The internal effects of a mutable policy
are still more calamitous. It poisons the blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the
people, that the laws are made by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they
cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before
they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is
to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that
be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?”).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The
legislature . . . prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen are to be
regulated.”).
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judiciary has the authority to decide “Cases” and “Controversies.”129
“That power does not license judges to craft new laws to govern future
conduct, but only to ‘discer[n] the course prescribed by law’ as it
currently exists and to ‘follow it’ in resolving disputes between the
people over past events.”130 This structure provides courts with the
power of judicial review,131 but the judiciary’s role is still distinct from
that of the legislature.
B. Early Precedent
Gradually, the common law practice of statutory lenity and the
American principle of judicial review combined and, in light of fairnotice concerns, developed into the void-for-vagueness doctrine.
Two early cases—The Enterprise132 and United States v.
Sharp133—entertained the issue of vagueness when evaluating laws
that were incomprehensible to the respective courts as written.134 In
The Enterprise, the court found there was no ground for enforcement
of an unintelligible embargo law135 and in Sharp, the court quashed an
indictment brought under an ambiguous law.136 The constitutional
grounds for these decisions are unclear, and scholars have long
debated whether the decisions rested in the rule of lenity, or an early
formulation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine.137 This dispute is
129. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
130. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1227 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22
U.S. 738, 866 (1824)).
131. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to
particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
132. 8 F. Cas. 732 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 4499) (evaluating a statute setting forth the
requirements for when ships may enter ports during an embargo).
133. 27 F. Cas. 1041 (C.C.D. Pa. 1815) (No. 16264) (considering a statute prohibiting seamen
from “making a revolt”).
134. Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra note 119, at 275–76.
135. Enterprise, 8 F. Cas. at 735 (“If no sense can be discovered for them, as they are here
introduced, the court had better pass them by as unintelligible and useless, than to put on them, at
great uncertainty, a very harsh signification, and one which the legislature may never have
designed.”).
136. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. at 1043 (“I am not able to support [the law] by any authority to be met
with, either in the common, admiralty, or civil law. If we resort to definitions given by philologists,
they are so multifarious, and so different, that I cannot avoid feeling a natural repugnance, to
selecting from this mass of definitions, one, which may fix a crime upon these men, and that too of
a captal [sic] nature; when, by making a different selection, it would be no crime at all, or certainly
not the crime intended by the legislature. Laws which create crimes, ought to be so explicit in
themselves, or by reference to some other standard, that all men, subject to their penalties, may
know what acts it is their duty to avoid.”).
137. Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, supra note 119, at 275 n.18.
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unsurprising, as the two practices are often difficult to distinguish—
while the techniques are different, the results are often the same.
Indeed, “prolonged application of a canon of construction could
circumvent the will of the legislature just as surely as would an
articulate declaration that the statute was ‘void for vagueness.’ The
result therefore, would be the same . . . [b]ut the technique [of strict
construction is] . . . more subtle.”138
The less-distinct blending of the doctrines continued through the
early twentieth century as courts focused on fair notice.139 In the
1920s, the Supreme Court began to explicitly connect the requirement
of fair notice to due process, giving the concept of vagueness
constitutional legs.140 Thus, while the origin of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine is uncertain, it is apparent that “the requirement of notice was
foremost in the minds of the Court in implementing this doctrine.”141
C. Contemporary Precedent
The stringent requirements of the void-for-vagueness doctrine
have long been limited to criminal laws, while civil laws have been
held to a more permissive standard.142 Generally stated, the
contemporary void-for-vagueness doctrine demands that criminal
138. Id. at 274 (“For example, the court would ‘strictly construe’ a statute requiring that notice
of a certain offense be proclaimed ‘in two market towns near the place where the offense was
committed’ to mean ‘those towns nearest the place of commission of the crime.’ Since notice was
not so given, defendant was released because not legally convicted.”); see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138
S. Ct. 1204, 1226–27 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
139. Lockwood, supra note 119, at 264 (“[I]n 1891, in United States v. Brewer, the Court
provided, ‘[l]aws which create crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties
may know what acts it is their duty to avoid,’ without reference to constitutional support. In 1914,
Mr. Justice Holmes in Nash v. United States limited the scope of the above principle with the oftenquoted statement, ‘[t]he law is full of instances where a man’s fate depends on his estimating
rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree,’ without specifically
providing a constitutional basis for the decision to uphold the portion of the Sherman Act that was
challenged as vague.”).
140. Id. at 264–66 (“In the 1921 case of United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., the Court relied
generally on the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, holding that a[] regulation . . . was ‘void for
repugnancy to the Constitution.’ Interestingly, by 1926, the Court expressed its firm belief that a
statute’s vagueness offends the Constitution. . . . In 1927, in Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., this
constitutional requirement was applied to a state . . . statute. The Court referenced L.
Cohen Grocery Co., . . . [and] then provided, ‘[w]e are now considering a case of state legislation
and threatened prosecutions in a state court where only the Fourteenth Amendment applies; but that
amendment requires that there should be due process of law, and this certainly imposes upon a State
an obligation to frame its criminal statutes so that those to whom they are addressed may know
what standard of conduct is intended to be required.’”).
141. Id. at 268.
142. Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498–99 (1982).
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statutes sufficiently and specifically define the offense such that
“ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a
manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.”143 This distinction is due to the Court’s “greater
tolerance of enactments with civil rather than criminal penalties
because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less
severe.”144 Although the doctrine is typically associated with criminal
laws, in practice, it is more broadly applied. The Supreme Court has
indeed extended the vagueness doctrine to civil laws, namely in
instances where the severity of the penalties at issue is great.145
D. Proper Scope
The plurality in Dimaya opted to extend the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to section 16(b) because the penalty—deportation—is the
most severe immigration consequence.146 Justice Gorsuch questioned
this decision, pondering:
[G]rave as [deportation] may be, I cannot see why we would
single it out for special treatment when . . . so many civil
laws today impose so many similarly severe sanctions. Why,
for example, would due process require Congress to speak
more clearly when it seeks to deport a lawfully resident alien
than when it wishes to subject a citizen to indefinite civil
commitment, strip him of a business license essential to his
family’s living, or confiscate his home? I can think of no
good answer.147
Indeed, no answer truly satisfies this question. The void-forvagueness doctrine is rooted in the fundamental concerns over the
143. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983).
144. Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 498–99; see Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204,
1212–13 (2018).
145. See, e.g., Vill. of Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. at 499 (applying a “relatively strict” vagueness
test to an ordinance that “nominally impose[d] only civil penalties,” because it was “quasi-criminal”
considering its “prohibitory and stigmatizing effect”); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500,
516–17 (1964) (finding a vagueness review warranted for a statute that “severely curtail[ed]
personal liberty” by restricting “freedom of travel”); Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 231 (1951)
(applying the vagueness doctrine to an immigration removal statute in light of the “grave nature of
deportation”); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court, 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940) (applying the
doctrine to a civil commitment statute); Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corp. Comm’n, 286 U.S. 210, 241
(1932) (extending the doctrine to a civil statute with a penalty that was “not consistent with any
purpose other than to inflict punishment”).
146. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. at 1210–12.
147. Id. at 1231 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property without fair notice. If a law is
constructed so vaguely that an ordinary person cannot determine the
conduct criminalized or penalized, then it is too vague, regardless of
the degree of the deprivation associated with its violation.
Moreover, extending the void-for-vagueness doctrine to all laws
honors the proper separation of powers. It is the duty of the legislature,
not the judiciary, to make laws. Although judicial review gives courts
the power to interpret laws, it does not give courts the power to writein meaning all-together where poor drafting has rendered a law
incomprehensible.
Rather than depending on an arbitrary distinction between civil
laws with severe penalties and those with less-than-severe penalties,
the void-for-vagueness doctrine should apply across the board to all
laws—civil or criminal—as a procedural due process guarantee.
Dimaya illustrates the importance of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine in practice. Had the traditional rule of lenity been used as it
once was, each of the circuits involved in the split of decision prior to
the Supreme Court’s ruling would have assigned a meaning to section
16(b). Some may have continued with the categorical approach, others
may have switched to a case-specific approach; some may have
incorporated a requisite level of risk, others may have set a list of
qualifying offenses. This is not a simple case of judicial review or
basic statutory interpretation. Such decisions regarding section 16(b)
would have fundamentally changed the effects of the law depending
on the jurisdiction it was enforced in. It is nearly impossible to have
fair notice of a law that holds different meanings depending on your
location. Instead, to void a law as unconstitutionally vague puts the
law out of use, lest it be remedied through the legislative process. This
approach best balances the due process concerns and separation of
powers principles at play. Limiting the scope of the void-forvagueness doctrine to certain groups of laws is unsound and
unnecessarily narrow.
VI. IMMIGRATION IMPLICATIONS
Although much of the decision focused on debate over the voidfor-vagueness doctrine, the core issue in Dimaya was the use of
section 16(b) as a ground for deportability. The Supreme Court’s
decision will have a slight immediate effect on immigration
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enforcement; however its true impact lies in its potential for future
litigation.
A. Section 16(b) as a Ground for Deportability
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dimaya, President
Donald Trump reacted on Twitter, posting:
Today’s Court decision means that Congress must close
loopholes that block the removal of dangerous criminal
aliens, including aggravated felons. This is a public safety
crisis that can only be fixed by....
….Congress – House and Senate must quickly pass a
legislative fix to ensure violent criminal aliens can be
removed from our society. Keep America Safe!148
The White House subsequently released an official statement, also
characterizing the decision as creating a “loophole” and calling for
legislative action.149 Immigration agencies responded similarly.150
It is concerning that the administration has painted this decision
as creating a loophole, a term that disparages the fundamental
constitutional principles at play.151 However, to call for legislative
action is the correct response. Indeed, this is the purpose of the voidfor-vagueness doctrine—to make Congress aware of constitutionally
defective laws so that they may be remedied through the legislative
process, rather than having courts assign new meaning.

148. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 17, 2018, 2:34 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/986357230219022342.
149. Statement by the Press Secretary Calling on Congress to Fix Loopholes in Our
Immigration Laws, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 18, 2018) https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-press-secretary-calling-congress-fix-loopholes-immigration-laws.
150. DHS Press Secretary Statement on Sessions v. Dimaya, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/04/17/dhs-press-secretary-statementsessions-v-dimaya (imploring Congress to “take action on passing legislation to close public safety
loopholes, such as these, that encourage illegal immigration and tie the hands of law enforcement”);
ICE Deputy Director Statement on Sessions v. Dimaya, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY: ICE
NEWSROOM (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.ice.gov/statements/ice-deputy-director-statementsessions-v-dimaya (referring to the decision as “yet another example of the need for Congress to
urgently close the loopholes that allow criminal aliens to avoid removal and remain in the United
States”).
151. Miriam Valverde, What the U.S. Supreme Court Decision Means for the Deportation of
Criminal Immigrants, POLITIFACT (Apr. 23, 2018, 9:00 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2018/apr/23/what-us-supreme-court-decision-means-deportation-c/ (“A
poorly
written statute is not a loophole . . . . It’s a constitutional defect. Congress has the authority to write
a new statue at any time. Vague language . . . is more accurately described as a loophole for the
government.”).
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In many ways, the reactions from President Trump and his
administration were overstated. Dimaya only directly voided one of
the eighty grounds for removal outlined in the INA.152 Even looking
specifically to removal of “criminal immigrants,” section 16(b) is a
sub-definition for just one of the more than twenty grounds for
establishing an aggravated felony conviction.153 To those facing
deportation on section 16(b) grounds, this decision matters. Yet in
light of the many other grounds for deportation of “criminal
immigrants” that have developed through the crimmigration
phenomenon, it is unclear how substantial this immediate impact will
actually be.154
As of now, the residual clause of section 16 cannot be used by
immigration authorities to qualify a conviction as being a crime of
violence to satisfy the aggravated felony ground for removability. It is
clear the executive branch and immigration authorities alike want
Congress to fix and clarify section 16(b) so that it may be used in
future immigration proceedings. Yet, until that action is taken, the
residual clause of section 16 is void for immigration purposes.
B. Future Vagueness Challenges
Dimaya’s most substantial impact on immigration law and policy
is likely to be in the future litigation it inspires. This decision creates
a sense of possibility. At minimum, immigration laws that result in
deportation or removal are now clearly subjected to the same strict
void-for-vagueness standard that criminal laws are held to.155 Section
16(b) is by no means the only questionable provision of the INA—
“Courts have used terms such as ‘nebulous,’ ‘bewildering,’ and
‘labyrinthine’ to describe immigration laws.”156 For example, the

152. IMMIGRANT JUSTICE NETWORK, ISSUE BRIEF: THE IMPLICATIONS OF SESSIONS V. DIMAYA,
https://www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/issue_brief_sessions_dimaya-20180501.pdf.
153. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)–(U) (2012).
154. See Leah Litman, Vague Criminality and Mass Incarceration: Will Dimaya End the
Insanity? HARV. L.R. BLOG (Apr. 17, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/vague-criminalityand-mass-incarceration-will-dimaya-end-the-insanity/ (discussing the potential scope of this
decision in terms of future and retroactive application).
155. Erwin Chemerinsky, What Sessions v. Dimaya Means for Immigration Law, ABA J.
(May 3, 2018, 8:30 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/why_sessions_v._dimaya_matters.
156. Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vagueness Doctrine, 2016 WIS. L.
REV. 1127, 1128 (2016) (citing Baltazar-Balcazar v. INS, 386 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004);
Franklin v. INS, 72 F.3d 751, 573 (8th Cir. 1995); Velasco v. United States Citizenship &
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Ninth Circuit has struggled with the aggravated felony sub-definition
of an “offense related to obstruction of justice.”157 Moreover, the use
of imprecise terms such as “crime involving moral turpitude,” “single
scheme of misconduct,” and “particularly serious crime” in the INA
could conceivably be challenged under the vagueness doctrine.158
With the Dimaya decision, the doors are open to procedural due
process challenges to INA provisions on the basis of vagueness.
Keeping in mind the twin aims of the void-for-vagueness doctrine—
providing fair notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement—
immigration reformists are now armed with a new tool to combat the
mounting crimmigration phenomenon.
VII. CONCLUSION
“[T]he power vested in the America courts of justice of
pronouncing a statute to be unconstitutional, forms one of the most
powerful barriers which has ever been devised against tyranny of
political assemblies.”159 The void-for-vagueness doctrine is rooted in
fundamental American concerns about the unjust deprivation of
fundamental rights. This doctrine allows the courts to hold the
legislature accountable for imprecise laws and ensures that ordinary
people have fair notice of what the law requires. The Supreme Court’s
extension of this doctrine into the realm of immigration law is
promising and shows a recognition of the severe consequences of
immigration enforcement. However, as this Comment advocates, the
void-for-vagueness doctrine ought to be extended to all laws—civil or
criminal, without regard for the severity of the consequences—so as
to comport with the standards of due process. Although the actual,
immediate impact on immigration law is limited, Dimaya’s legacy will
likely be in its furtherance of the void-for-vagueness doctrine. Dimaya
opens the door for future constitutional challenges at least to imprecise
immigration laws, and conceivably indefinite civil laws.
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